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Abstract
This study presents voting on policies including public education, taxes, and
public debt in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital
accumulation and analyzes the eects of a debt ceiling on the government's policy
formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The debt ceiling induces the
government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations and
increase public education spending, resulting in a higher growth rate. However, it
creates a trade-o between generations in terms of welfare. Alternatively, the debt
ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner; lowering the debt
ceiling makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in
an aging society.
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1 Introduction
Many developed countries have experienced large budget decits and growing public debt
in the past two decades. In 1998, the average general government debt as a percentage of
GDP was 73.58% in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries, while it was 93.70% in 2017. In particular, the ratio increased more
than 40 points in France, Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.1 The increased public debt is also a feature of developing countries (World
Bank, 2019). Given this background, various types of scal rules have been introduced
to control decits, spending, and debt (e.g., Budina et al., 2012). In 2013, rules were in
place in 97 countries (Halac and Yared, 2018).
The present study focuses on debt ceilings that control public debt and decits. Im-
posing debt ceilings constrains scal policy choice (Heinemann, Moessinger, and Yeter,
2018) and thus may have the potential to improve welfare since political frictions in s-
cal policymaking mean that the equilibrium public debt level is too high relative to the
ecient one (Battaglini and Coate, 2008). Specically, imposing debt ceilings may create
long-run benets of a lower debt burden at the cost of potentially short-run increased
tax burdens and thus a net benet in terms of welfare. The possibility of such welfare
improvement is shown to be achieved by introducing a balanced budget rule (Azzimonti,
Battaglini, and Coate, 2016) and an austerity program with a target level for debt and a
time horizon (Barseghyan and Battaglini, 2016).
A welfare improvement is possible in the frameworks of Azzimonti, Battaglini, and
Coate (2016) and Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016) because they assume innitely lived
households that can make up the short-run increased tax burdens with the benets of
reduced debt burdens accruing in the future. Such an improvement is not seen when
we alternatively assume overlapping generations of nitely lived households (Arai, Naito,
and Ono, 2018). In particular, agents who owe the costs of increased tax burdens today
would not be alive in the future to enjoy the benets of reduced debt burdens, suggesting
a limitation of debt ceilings.
The present study reexamines debt ceilings from the viewpoint of the political economy.
To pursue our analysis, we present an overlapping-generations model with physical and
human capital accumulation (e.g., Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014;
Ono and Uchida, 2016). Each generation comprises many identical individuals who live
over three periods: young, middle, and old ages. Public education spending and parental
human capital are inputs in the human capital formation process, thereby contributing
to children's human capital formation and economic growth. Governments, as elected
1Source: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm (Accessed on June 14, 2019).
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representatives, nance public education spending through taxes on capital and labor
income and public debt issues.
Under this framework, we consider the politics of scal policy formation. In particular,
following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and the studies that have followed, we
assume probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) to demonstrate the extent
to which generations face conict over such policies. In each period, middle-aged and old
individuals vote.2 The government in power maximizes the political objective function of
the weighted sum of the utilities of the middle-aged and old populations. In this voting
environment, the current policy choice aects the decision on future policy via physical
and human capital accumulation. To demonstrate this intertemporal eect, we employ
the concept of a Markov-perfect equilibrium under which scal policy today depends on
the current payo-relevant state variables, namely physical and human capital and public
debt. Given this process, we characterize the political equilibrium in the absence or
presence of the debt ceiling, which yields the following ndings.
Firstly, we provide a characterization of the political equilibrium in the absence of
the debt ceiling and then compare it with an alternative scenario, called tax nancing,
in which the government is prohibited from issuing public debt; hence, its expenditure
is nanced solely through taxation. This scenario, while an extreme one, enables us to
investigate the eect of controlling debt issues in a tractable way. We show that the
labor tax rate increases, while the capital tax rate decreases if the government changes
its instrument from debt nancing to tax nancing. Consequently, changes in tax rates
could produce two opposing eects. In addition, tax nancing removes the crowding-out
eect of public bonds on physical capital and thus enhances human capital accumulation.
Distant future generations benet from this positive accumulation eect that outweighs
the eects through taxes, whereas the initial generation does not. Therefore, the change
in nancing produces a trade-o in terms of utility across generations.
Secondly, we consider a more realistic scal rule that sets an explicit ceiling for public
debt as a percentage of GDP, which has been widely introduced in developed countries
(Schaechter et al., 2012). We investigate the eect of such a scal tightening rule (i.e.,
lowering the ceiling) based on a numerical analysis and show that this scal tightening
rule is growth-enhancing, but not Pareto-improving. We also nd that even if the rule
is imposed only for limited periods, it has a long-lasting eect on utility across genera-
tions since increased human capital is bequeathed from generation to generation. Our
result suggests the importance of connecting seemingly unrelated subjects, namely public
2The young may also have an incentive to vote since they benet from public education in the future.
However, for the tractability of the analysis, we assume that politicians do not care about the young's
preferences following Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), and Lancia and
Russo (2016). This assumption is supported in part by the fact that a large number of the young are
below the voting age.
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education and public debt, to consider the impact of debt ceilings over time and across
generations.
Thirdly, we evaluate the optimality of the political equilibrium from the viewpoint
of the planner's allocation. The long-lived planner has an incentive to invest more in
education than short-sighted politicians. This implies that the share of the resources
devoted to education (consumption) is higher (lower) in the planner's allocation than at
the political equilibrium in the absence of a debt ceiling, showing the sub-optimality of the
political equilibrium. To resolve this, we control the debt ceiling to approach the planner's
allocation and show that the realization of the approach depends on the political power
of the old, represented by their weight in the political objective function. In particular,
under certain conditions, lowering the debt ceiling enables politicians to approach the
planner's allocation when the political weight of the old is high, whereas it does not when
the political weight is low, suggesting a rationale for strengthening scal discipline in an
aging society.
In the main analysis, we assume that public spending is limited to education and that
the old do not benet from any public expenditure. When the old directly benet from
public expenditure such as public good provision, they may induce politicians to raise
expenditure on them as well as place the scal burden onto future generations by issuing
more public debt. We examine this possibility and show that such a case does not arise
because the middle-aged, who also benet from public good provision, nd it optimal to
reduce debt issues and increase public good provision in their old age. This disciplined
eect (as also found by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012) works to reduce rather
than increase public debt issues.
Relation to the Literature The present study follows Cukierman and Meltzer (1989),
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012, 2016), Rohrs (2016), and Ono and Uchida (2018)
by employing the overlapping-generations model with public debt and introduces debt
ceilings into the model. The study departs from previous ones and contributes to the
literature in three ways. First, it assumes two dierent taxes, the labor income tax on the
middle-aged and the capital income tax on the retired old, rather than a single tax instru-
ment, a tax on labor income, as assumed in previous studies. This assumption enables
us to demonstrate how the costs of the debt ceiling are distributed between generations
through tax burdens and how this distribution in turn aects growth and welfare over
time and across generations.
Second, the present study focuses on public education as a source of economic growth
through human capital accumulation.3 This enables us to demonstrate the endogenous
3Ono and Uchida (2018) also present a model with physical and human capital accumulation, but it
assumes that only one generation participates in voting, thus lacking generational conict over taxes and
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determination of an interest rate and its impact on policy formation. This general equilib-
rium eect is absent in Arai, Naito, and Ono (2018), who employ AK technology, as well as
Battaglini and Coate (2008, 2016), Barseghyan, Battaglini, and Coate (2013), Azzimonti,
Battaglini, and Coate (2016), and Cunha and Ornelas (2018), who assume constant inter-
est rates. Exceptions are Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012), Rohrs (2016), Arawatari
and Ono (2017), Katagiri, Konishi, and Ueda (2019), and Barseghyan and Battaglini
(2016); however, the rst four consider economies without economic growth. Barseghyan
and Battaglini (2016) demonstrate the general equilibrium eect by considering public
investment as a source of productivity growth. In particular, they show that a temporary
austerity program induces only a temporary eect on policies and economic growth. By
contrast, the present study shows that the temporary program has a long-lasting eect
through human capital accumulation that benets future generations. This result sug-
gests the potential importance of public education and human capital when we evaluate
the eect of debt rules in the short and long run.
Third, the present study introduces an imaginary social planner who cares about all
generations and aims to maximize the weighted sum of utilities across generations. Then,
it investigates under what conditions the debt ceiling induces politicians to choose a scal
policy that approximates the planner's allocation. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012)
use the planner's allocation to evaluate the optimality of the political equilibrium in the
absence of a debt ceiling, whereas Arai, Naito, and Ono (2018) rely on the Pareto criterion
to evaluate the eects of a debt ceiling on welfare across generations. The present study
is thus an attempt to bridge the gap between these two studies. The study is also related
to Cunha and Ornelas (2018), who point out that a tight debt ceiling can exacerbate
political economy distortions, focusing on the degree of political turnover. We instead
focus on the political power of the old and oer an alternative insight into the eect of
debt ceilings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 describes the political equilibrium. Section 4 compares the debt- and tax-
nancing political equilibria; it also investigates the eects of the debt ceiling rule. Section
5 provides a characterization of the planner's allocation and compares it with the political
equilibrium. Section 6 investigates the case including public good provision. Section 7
presents concluding remarks.
2 Model
The discrete time economy starts in period 0 and consists of overlapping generations.
Individuals are identical within a generation and live for three periods: youth, middle,
spending.
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and old ages. Each middle-aged individual gives birth to 1+n children. The middle-aged
population for period t is Nt and the population grows at a constant rate of n(>  1) :
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt. Individuals who are middle-aged in period t are called generation t.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals display the following economic behavior over their lifecycles. During youth,
they make no economic decisions and receive public education nanced by the government.
In middle age, individuals work, receive market wages, and make tax payments. They
use after-tax income for consumption and savings. Individuals retire in their old age and
receive and consume returns from savings.
Consider an individual born in period t   1. In period t, the individual is middle-
aged and endowed with ht units of human capital inherited from his or her parents. The
individual supplies them inelastically in the labor market and obtains labor income wtht,
where wt is the wage rate per ecient unit of labor in period t. After paying tax twtht,
where t 2 (0; 1) is the period t labor income tax rate, the individual distributes the after-
tax income between consumption ct and savings invested in physical capital st. Therefore,
the period t budget constraint for the middle-aged becomes
ct + st  (1  t)wtht:
The period t+ 1 budget constraint in elderly age is
dt+1 
 
1   kt+1

Rt+1st;
where dt+1 is consumption, 
k
t+1 is the period t + 1 capital income tax rate, Rt+1(> 0)
is the gross return from investment in physical capital, and Rt+1st is the return from
savings. The results are qualitatively unchanged if capital income tax is on the net return
from saving rather than the gross return.
Children's human capital in period t + 1, ht+1, is a function of government spending
on public education, xt, and parents' human capital, ht. In particular, ht+1 is formulated
using the following equation:
ht+1 = D (xt)
 (ht)
1  ; (1)
where D(> 0) is a scale factor and  2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of education technology
with respect to education spending.4
4Private investment in education may also contribute to human capital formation. For example,
the parents' time (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995, 2001, 2003; Glomm and Kaganovich, 2008) or spending
(Glomm, 2004; Lambrecht, Michel, and Vidal, 2005; Kunze, 2014) devoted to education may complement
public education. In the present study, we abstract private education from the main analysis to simplify
the presentation of the model.
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The preferences of an individual born in period t   1 are specied by the following
expected utility function in the logarithmic form:
Ut = ln ct +  ln dt+1;
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor. We substitute the budget constraints into the utility
function to form the following unconstrained maximization problem:
max
fstg
ln [(1  t)wtht   st] +  ln
 
1   kt+1

Rt+1st:
By solving this problem, we obtain the following savings and consumption functions:
st =

1 + 
 (1  t)wtht; (2)
ct =
1
1 + 
 (1  t)wtht,
dt+1 =
 
1   kt+1

Rt+1  
1 + 
 (1  t)wtht:
2.2 Firms
Each period contains a continuum of identical rms that are perfectly competitive prot
maximizers. According to Cobb{Douglas technology, they produce a nal good Yt us-
ing two inputs: aggregate physical capital Kt and aggregate human capital Ht  Ntht.
Aggregate output is given by
Yt = A (Kt)
 (Ht)
1  ,
where A(> 0) is a scale parameter and  2 (0; 1) denotes the capital share.
Hereafter, we denote by x^t the ratio of Xt to aggregate human capital, Ht, and by
xt per capita Xt : x^t  Xt=Ht and xt  Xt=Nt. Thus, k^t  Kt=Ht denotes the ratio of
physical to human capital. The rst-order conditions for prot maximization with respect
to Ht and Kt are
wt = (1  )A

k^t

; (3)
t = A

k^t
 1
; (4)
where wt and t are labor wages and the rental price of capital, respectively. These
conditions state that rms hire human and physical capital until the marginal products
are equal to the factor prices. Capital is assumed to depreciate fully within each period.
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2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Public education expenditure is nanced by both taxes on capital and labor income and
public bond issues. Let Bt denote aggregate inherited debt. The government budget
constraint in period t is
Bt+1 + 
k
t Rtst 1Nt 1 + twthtNt = Nt+1xt +RtBt;
where Bt+1 is newly issued public bonds, 
k
t Rtst 1Nt 1 is aggregate capital tax revenue,
twthtNt is aggregate labor tax revenue, Nt+1xt is aggregate expenditure on public edu-
cation, and RtBt is debt repayment. We assume a one-period debt structure to derive
analytical solutions from the model. We also assume that the government in each period
is committed to not repudiating the debt.
By dividing both sides of the above expression by Nt, we obtain a per capita form of
the constraint:
(1 + n)bt+1 + 
k
t Rt
st 1
1 + n
+ twtht = (1 + n)xt +Rtbt; (5)
where bt  Bt=Nt is per capita public debt.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
Public bonds are traded in the domestic capital market. The market-clearing condition
for capital is Bt+1 + Kt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality of total savings by the
middle-aged population in period t; Ntst, to the sum of the stocks of aggregate public
debt and aggregate physical capital at the beginning of period t+1, Bt+1+Kt+1. By using
k^t+1  Kt+1=Ht+1, ht+1 = Ht+1=Nt+1, and the savings function in (2), we can rewrite the
condition as
(1 + n)

k^t+1ht+1 + bt+1

=

1 + 
(1  t)wtht: (6)
The following denes the economic equilibrium in the present model.
Denition 1. Given a sequence of policies,

 kt ; t; xt
	1
t=0
, an economic equilibrium is
a sequence of allocations
n
ct; dt; st; k^t+1; bt+1; ht+1
o1
t=0
and prices ft; wt; Rtg1t=0 with
the initial conditions k^0(> 0); b0( 0) and h0(> 0), such that (i) given
 
wt; Rt+1; 
k
t ; t; xt

; 
cyt ; c
o
t+1; st

solves the utility maximization problem; (ii) given (wt; t), k^t solves a
rm's prot maximization problem; (iii) given (wt; ht; Rt; bt) ;
 
 kt ; t; xt; bt+1

satis-
es the government budget constraint; (iv) an arbitrage condition t = Rt holds;
and (v) the capital market clears: (1 + n) 

k^t+1ht+1 + bt+1

= st.
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In the economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of the middle-aged population in
period t, V Mt , and that of the old population in period t, V
o
t , can be expressed as functions
of scal policy, physical and human capital, and public debt as follows:
V Mt = (1 + ) ln(1  )A

k^t

ht (1  t) +  lnR

k^t+1

+  ln
 
1   kt+1

+ M ; (7)
V ot = ln
 
1   kt

+ O

k^t; ht; bt

; (8)
where R

k^t+1

 A

k^t+1
 1
is the gross return from investment in physical capital,
and M and O

kt; h^t; b^t

; including policy-irrelevant and constant terms, are dened by
M 

ln
1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 

+  lnA;
O

k^t; ht; bt

 lnA

k^t
 1
(1 + n)

k^tht + bt

;
respectively.
3 Political Equilibrium
In this section, we consider voting on scal policy. In particular, we employ probabilistic
voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In this voting scheme, there is electoral com-
petition between two oce-seeking candidates. Each candidate announces a set of scal
policies subject to the government budget constraint. As demonstrated by Persson and
Tabellini (2000), the two candidates' platforms converge in the equilibrium to the same
scal policy that maximizes the weighted average utility of voters.
In the present framework, the young, middle-aged, and elderly have an incentive to
vote. While the young may benet from current public education expenditure through
human capital accumulation, we assume that their preferences are not taken into account
by politicians. We impose this assumption, which is often used in the literature (e.g.,
Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Bernasconi and Profeta, 2012; Lancia and Russo, 2016),
for tractability reasons. However, the assumption could be supported in part by the fact
that a large number of the young are below the voting age.
Thus, the political objective is dened as the weighted sum of the utility of the middle-
aged and old, given by ~
t  !V ot + (1 + n)(1  !)V Mt , where ! 2 [0; 1] and 1  ! are the
political weights placed on the old and middle-aged in period t, respectively. The weight
of the middle-aged is adjusted by the gross population growth rate, (1 + n), to reect
their share of the population. To gain the intuition, we divide ~
t by (1 + n)(1  !) and
redene the objective function as follows:

t =
!
(1 + n)(1  !)V
o
t + V
M
t ;
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where the coecient !=(1+n)(1 !) of V ot represents the relative political weight of the
old.
We substitute V Mt in (7) and V
o
t in (8) into 
t and obtain

t ' !
(1 + n)(1  !) ln
 
1   kt

+ (1 + ) ln (1  )A

k^t

ht (1  t)
+  lnR

k^t+1

+  ln
 
1   kt+1

: (9)
We use the notation ' because irrelevant terms are omitted from the expression of 
t.
With the use of (3){(6), we can reformulate the expression in (9) as follows:

t ' !
(1 + n)(1  !) ln
 
1   kt

+ (1 + ) lnZ

 kt ; xt; bt+1; k^t; bt; ht

+ lnR

K^

bt+1; xt; Z

 kt ; xt; bt+1; k^t; bt; ht

+  ln
 
1   kt+1

; (10)
where Z () ; K^ () ; and R () represent the after-tax income of the middle-aged, the next-
period ratio of physical to human capital, and the gross return from investment in physical
capital, respectively. With (3){(6), they are dened as follows:
Z( kt ; xt; bt+1; k^t; bt; ht)  A

k^t

ht  
 
1   kt

A

k^t
 1 
k^tht + bt

  (1 + n)xt + (1 + n)bt+1;
K^

bt+1; xt; Z

 kt ; xt; bt+1; k^t; bt; ht



1+
Z ()  (1 + n)bt+1
(1 + n)D(xt)
;
R

K^ ()

 A

K^ ()
 1
:
The political objective function in (10) suggests that the current policy choice aects
the decision on future policy via physical and human capital accumulation. In particular,
the period t choices of  kt , xt, and bt+1 aect the formation of physical and human capital
in period t+ 1. This in turn inuences the decision making on period-t+ 1 scal policy.
To demonstrate such an intertemporal eect, we employ the concept of a Markov-perfect
equilibrium under which scal policy today depends on the current payo-relevant state
variables.
In the present framework, the payo-relevant state variables are the ratio of physical
to human capital, k^t, public debt, bt, and human capital, ht. Thus, the expected rate
of capital income tax for the next period,  kt+1, is given by the function of the period-
t + 1 state variables,  kt+1 = T
k

k^t+1; bt+1; ht+1

. We denote by  (< 0) and   k(< 0)
the arbitrary lower limits of  and  k, respectively. By using recursive notation with z0
denoting the next period z; we can now dene a Markov-perfect political equilibrium in
the present framework as follows.
9
Denition 2. A Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions, hT; T k; X;Bi,
where T : <3+ ! (  ; 1) is a labor income tax rule,  = T (k^; b; h), T k : <3+ !   k; 1 is a capital income tax rule,  k = T k(k^; b; h); X : <3+ ! <+ is a public
education expenditure rule, x = X(k^; b; h), and B : <3+ ! <+ is a public debt rule,
b0 = B(k^; b; h), such that the following conditions are satised:
(i) The capital market clears,
(1 + n)

k^0h0 + b0

=

1 + 
(1  ) (1  )A

k^

h; (11)
(ii) Given k^; b; and h;
D
T (k^; b; h); T k(k^; b; h); X(k^; b; h); B(k^; b; h)
E
= argmax
 subject
to  k0 = T k

k^0; b0; h0

; the capital market-clearing condition in (11), the government
budget constraint,
(1 + n)b0 +  (1  )A

k^

h+  kA

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

= (1 + n)x+ A

k^
 1
b;
(12)
and the human capital formation function, h0 = D(h)1 

X(k^; b; h)

, where 
 is
dened by (10).
Two remarks are in order. First, Denition 2 allows the tax rates to be negative.
However, the following analysis shows that the capital income tax rate from period 1
onward is positive. It also establishes the conditions for the capital income tax rate
in period 0 and the labor income tax rate in the long run to be positive. Second, the
state variables do not align in compact sets because they grow across periods. To dene
the equilibrium more precisely, we need to redene the equilibrium as a mapping from a
compact set to a compact set. We can do this by introducing the following notations: ~xt 
xt=A

k^t

ht and ~bt+1  bt+1=A

k^t

ht. However, for the simplicity of the exposition,
we dene the equilibrium as in Denition 2.
3.1 Characterization of the Political Equilibrium
To obtain the set of policy functions in Denition 2, we conjecture the following capital
tax rate in the next period:
 k0 = 1  T kun
1


1 + b
0
k^0h0
 ; (13)
where T kun(> 0) is constant. The subscript \un" means that public debt issuance is
\unconstrained." In the next section, we consider a case where public debt issuance is
\constrained" by a constitutional rule and compare it with the unconstrained case.
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Given the conjecture in (13), we consider the maximization of 
 in (10). The rst-order
conditions with respect to b0,  k; and x are as follows:
b0 : 1+
Z
@Z
@b0| {z }
(b.1)
+ 
R
@R
@K^
0B@@K^@Z @Z@b0| {z }
(b.2)
+ @K^
@b0|{z}
(b.3)
1CA+ 1 k
8><>:@(1 k0)@K^
264@K^@Z @Z@b0| {z }
(b.4)
+ @K^
@b0|{z}
(b.5)
375+ @(1 k0)@b0| {z }
(b.6)
9>=>;  0;
(14)
 k :   !
(1+n)(1 !)
1
1 k| {z }
(k.1)
+ 1+
Z
@Z
@k| {z }
(k.2)
+ 
R
@R
@K^
@K^
@Z
@Z
@k| {z }
(k.3)
+ 
1 k0
@(1 k0)
@K^
@K^
@Z
@Z
@k| {z }
(k.4)
 0; (15)
x : 1+
Z
@Z
@x| {z }
(x.1)
+ 
R
@R
@K^
0B@@K^@Z @Z@x| {z }
(x.2)
+ @K^
@x|{z}
(x.3)
1CA+ 1 k0
8><>:@(1 k0)@K^
264@K^@Z @Z@x| {z }
(x.4)
+ @K^
@x|{z}
(x.5)
375+ @(1 k0)@h0 @h0@x| {z }
(x.6)
9>=>; = 0;
(16)
where a strict inequality holds in (14) if b0 = 0 and in (15) if  k = 0. By using these
conditions, we can verify the conjecture in (13) and obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. There is a Markov-perfect political equilibrium characterized by b0 > 0.
The corresponding policy functions of b0,  k, x, and  are as follows:
(1 + n)b0 = BunA

k^

h;
 k = 1  T kun
1


1 + b
k^h
 ;
(1 + n)x = XunA

k^

h;
 = 1  Tun;
where Bun, T
k
un, Xun, and Tun are dened by
Bun   (1  )!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]
;
T kun 
!
(1+n)(1 !)
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]
;
Xun   (1  )!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]
;
Tun  1 + 
1   
1
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
:
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The result in Proposition 1 states that the government always borrows in the capital
market and thus passes a part of the tax burden onto future generations by issuing public
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debt. To understand the mechanism behind this result, recall the rst-order condition
with respect to b0 in (14). The condition indicates that the issue of public debt creates a
crowding-out eect on physical capital and thus raises the return from savings as presented
by the term (b.3). However, under the conjecture in (13), it also raises the next period
capital income tax burden as presented by the terms (b.5) and (b.6).
The issue of public debt enables the government to cut labor income tax on the
middle-aged. This lowers their tax burden and thus increases their lifetime consumption,
as represented by the term (b.1). At the same time, it increases the saving of the middle-
aged, the ratio of physical to human capital, and thus lowers the next period capital
income tax burden as represented by the term (b.4). However, an increase in the physical
to human capital ratio lowers the return from saving, R, as presented by the term (b.2).
To summarize, three marginal benets, represented by the terms (b.1), (b.3), and (b.4),
and three marginal costs, represented by the terms (b.2), (b.5), and (b.6), arise from
public debt issues. The sum of the former ones outweigh the sum of the latter ones in the
present framework. Therefore, the government nds it optimal to issue public debt.
Next, recall the rst-order condition with respect to  k in (15) to consider the for-
mation of the policy function of the capital income tax rate. The term (k.1) shows the
marginal cost of taxation for the old; raising the tax rate increases their tax burden and
thus lowers their consumption. The terms (k.2){(k.4) present the marginal cost or benet
for the middle-aged. The government can cut the labor income tax rate and thus lower
the tax burden on the middle-aged by raising the capital income tax rate. This creates a
positive income eect on the consumption of the middle-aged, as presented by the term
(k.2). In addition, it creates a positive income eect on saving and physical capital for-
mation, and thus lowers the capital income tax burden in the next period, as presented by
the term (k.4). However, at the same time, it lowers the return from saving, as presented
by the term (k.3). Therefore, there are two marginal benets, presented by the terms
(b.2) and (b.4), and two marginal costs, presented by the terms (b.1) and (b.3). The net
eect of these forces is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For ! 2 [0; 1), the capital income tax rate is (i) positive for t  1; and
(ii) positive in period 0 if and only if the following condition holds:
b0
k^0h0
>
!
(1+n)(1 !)

h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  ( +  (1  ))
i   1:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The result in Corollary 1 suggests that the political weight of the old, denoted by !, is
crucial to determining the capital income tax rate in the political equilibrium. For t  1,
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the capital income tax rate is given by
 kt = 1 
1
1 + (1+n)(1 !)
!
f1 +  [ +  (1  )]g :
The old want to reduce their tax burdens because they obtain no benet from public
education expenditure. This implies that the tax rate decreases as the political weight of
the old rises. In particular, the tax rate becomes zero as the weight of the old approaches
100%. In other words, the capital income tax rate remains positive as long as the govern-
ment attaches some weight to the middle-aged. Thus, the result in Corollary 1 implies
that the presence of generational conict allows the government to levy a capital income
tax rate on the old.
Finally, recall the rst-order conditions with respect to x in (16) to consider the
formation of the policy function of public education expenditure. By comparing (14) with
(16), we nd that the eects of a decrease in public debt issues are qualitatively equivalent
to the eects of an increase in public education expenditure. Thus, the government chooses
the expenditure to balance the sum of the marginal benets, represented by the terms
(x.2), (x.5), and (x.6), and the sum of the marginal costs, represented by the terms (x.1),
(x.3), and (x.4). Given the policy functions of b0, x; and  k, the labor income tax rate 
is determined to satisfy the government budget constraint.
3.2 Steady State
Having established the policy functions, we are now ready to demonstrate the accumula-
tion of physical and human capital. We substitute the policy functions in Proposition 1
into the capital market-clearing condition in (11) and human capital formation function
in (1), and obtain
k^0 = 	K
h
A

k^
i1 
; (17)
h0
h
= D	H
h
A

k^
i
; (18)
where 	K and 	H are dened by
	K  !
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]

(1 + n)D

Xun
1 + n
 1
; (19)
and
	H 

Xun
1 + n

; (20)
respectively. Appendix A.3 shows the derivation of (17) and (18).
Given fk^0; h0g, the sequence fk^t; htg is distinguished by the above two equations in
(17) and (18). A steady state is dened as a political equilibrium with k^t = k^t+1. In other
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words, the ratio of physical to human capital is constant in a steady state. Equation (17)
indicates that there is a unique, stable steady state. Along the steady-state path, the
capital income tax rate remains within [0; 1), as shown in Corollary 1, and human capital
increases, as suggested in (18). The following proposition summarizes the argument thus
far and identies the conditions under which the labor income tax rate is set within the
range [0; 1) in the steady state.
Proposition 2. There is a unique, stable steady-state equilibrium with b0 > 0,  k 2
[0; 1); and  2 [0; 1) if
1 + 
1     f1 +  [ +  (1  )]g 
!
(1 + n)(1  !) : (21)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests that the relative political weight of the old, rep-
resented by !=(1 + n)(1   !), plays a crucial role in shaping the labor income tax rate.
When !=(1 + n)(1  !) is below the lower bound in (21), the relative political weight of
the old is too low to incentivize the government to tax the young. The government would
rather subsidize the young by choosing  < 0. We rule out this possibility by imposing
the upper bound of !=(1 + n)(1  !).
4 Fiscal Rules
In the previous section, we considered scal policy and economic growth in the absence of
constraints on public bond issues except for the ow budget constraint. In other words,
we assumed no rule on public bond issuance. However, in practice, many countries have
introduced scal rules that control public debt (Schaechter et al., 2012; Budina et al.,
2012). In addition, in the present framework, public bond issuance creates a crowding-
out eect on physical capital formation and economic growth, which in turn triggers the
welfare loss for future generations. This observation motivates us to consider the question
of how scal rules shape the choice of scal policy and aect economic growth and welfare
across time and generations.
To answer this question, in Section 4.1 we rst consider the following alternative
scenario in which the government is prohibited from issuing public bonds and thus its
expenditure is nanced solely through taxation. As shown in Proposition 1, in the ab-
sence of the tax-nancing rule, the government borrows in the capital market and issues
public bonds. In other words, the government wants to issue public bonds to nance its
expenditure, but their issuance is prohibited when the tax-nancing rule is introduced.
We then compare the tax rates, expenditure, and economic growth in the debt-nancing
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case in the previous section with those in the tax-nancing case. We also investigate the
welfare consequences of shifting from debt nancing to tax nancing.
The requirement for tax nancing is somewhat extreme because in reality the govern-
ment is allowed to issue public bonds as long as their issuance is below some debt ceiling.
Hence, in Section 4.2, we overcome this shortcoming by considering an alternative s-
cal rule for managing the debt issuance-to-GDP ratio widely introduced in developed
countries.
4.1 Tax Financing versus Debt Financing
The policy functions in the tax-nancing case are obtained by assuming b0 = 0 in the
rst-order conditions with respect to  k; b0, and x in (15){(16) (see Appendix A.4). To
investigate the dierences between the tax-nancing and debt-nancing cases, we compare
their tax rates,  k and  , public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio, (1 + n)x=y, where
y  Y=N is per capita GDP, and economic growth, h0=h. The variables in the tax-nancing
and debt-nancing cases are denoted by the subscripts \tax" and \debt,"respectively.
Proposition 3. Given the initial conditions k0 and b0, tax nancing and debt nancing
are compared as follows:
 k0

tax
=  k0

debt
;  kt

tax
<  kt

debt
for t  1;  jtax >  jdebt ;
(1 + n)x=yjtax = (1 + n)x=yjdebt ; and h0=hjtax > h0=hjdebt :
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In the initial period, the government needs to nance the repayment of outstanding
public debt, b0, regardless of the nancing method. Thus, the capital tax rates are equal
in the two nancing cases in the initial period. However, from period 1 onward, the
government incurs no repayment costs in the tax-nancing case, while it still incurs such
costs in the debt-nancing case. Because of this dierence, the capital tax rate is lower
in the tax-nancing case than in the debt-nancing case from period 1.
By contrast, the labor tax rate is higher in the tax-nancing case than in the debt-
nancing case. When the tax-nancing rule is introduced, the government needs to com-
pensate for the loss of revenue from bond issues by raising the labor income tax rate.
An increase in revenue from the labor tax is oset by a decrease in revenue from the
capital tax and public bond issues. Thus, the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio re-
mains unchanged. However, the introduction of tax nancing removes the crowding-out
eect of public bonds. This positive eect on physical capital enhances human capital
accumulation and economic growth.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests that the shift from debt nancing to tax nancing
increases the growth rate and benets future generations, but may worsen the current
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middle-aged population because of the increased labor tax burden. We investigate this
welfare implication and obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Individuals who are middle-aged in period t are called generation t. (i)
The welfare of the initial old population is unaected; generation 0 is made worse
o by shifting from debt nancing to tax nancing. (ii) There is a critical period,
denoted by t^(> 1), such that generation t  t^ is made worse o, whereas generation
t > t^ is made better o by shifting from debt nancing to tax nancing.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The welfare of the initial old population is unaected by shifting to tax nancing since
their tax burden is unchanged. However, the choice of tax nancing has two opposing
eects on current and future generations. Tax nancing raises the tax burden of the
middle-aged population as demonstrated in Proposition 3. This lowers the lifetime income
of the middle-aged and thus lowers their lifetime utility of consumption. This is the
negative eect of tax nancing. However, tax nancing removes the crowding-out eect
of public bonds on capital and thus enhances human capital accumulation. This positive
eect appears from generation 1 onward and accumulates over time, but generation 0
cannot enjoy this benet. Therefore, generation 0 suers from a negative eect, whereas
distant future generations benet from a positive eect that outweighs the negative one.
4.2 Debt Ceiling
This section extends the analysis of the previous section by considering the following debt
rule:
Bt+1
Yt
 u:
This rule resembles the debt rule that sets an explicit ceiling for public debt as a percentage
of GDP (Schaechter et al., 2012). This is reformulated as
(1 + n)bt+1  uA

k^t

ht; (22)
where u is dened by
u  "Bun; " 2 [0; 1) ;
and the denition of Bun is provided in Proposition 1. The rule resembles the tax-nancing
case in Section 4.1 when " ! 0 and the unconstrained debt-nancing case in Section 3
when "! 1.
Debt issuance in the absence of the rule in (22) is given by (1 + n)b0 = BunA

k^

h^
as demonstrated in Proposition 1. When the debt rule in (22) is introduced, it is always
binding since " < 1. Thus, the issue of public bonds in the presence of the rule in (22) is
(1 + n)b0 = "BunA

k^

h:
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With the use of (1 + n)b0 = "BunA

k^

h, the political objective function in (10) is
reformulated as follows:

 ' !
(1 + n)(1  !) ln
 
1   k+ (1 + ) lnZ
0@ k; x; "BunA

k^

h
1 + n
; k^; b; h
1A
+  lnR
0@K^
0@"BunA

k^

h
1 + n
; xt; Z
0@ k; x; "BunA

k^

h
1 + n
; k^; b; h
1A1A1A+  ln  1   k0 :
(23)
Following the procedure described in Section 3, we consider the maximization of 
 with
respect to  k and x, and obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. In the presence of the debt rule in (22), a Markov-perfect political
equilibrium is characterized by the following policy functions:
 k = 1  T kcon
1


1 + b=k^h
 ;
(1 + n)x = XconA

k^

h;
 = 1  1
1  

(1 + "Bun) 

1 +
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1
 (1  )

Xcon

;
where Bun is dened in Proposition 1, and T
k
con, Xcon, and the associated variables
are dened as
T kcon 
1

 !
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1
 (1  ) 
H  
q
(H)2   4GI
2G
;
Xcon 
H  
q
(H)2   4GI
2G
;
G 

1 +
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1
 (1  )
 
!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]

> 0;
H   (1  )

1 +
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1
 (1  )
 
(1 + "Bun) +

1  "Bun


+  (1 + "Bun) +

1  "Bun


> 0;
I   (1  ) (1 + "Bun)

1  "Bun


> 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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Following the procedure described in Section 3, we show the existence and uniqueness
of steady-state capital. Recall the capital market-clearing condition in (11), which is
rewritten as follows:
k^0 =

1+
(1  ) (1  )  "Bun
(1 + n)D(h)1 (x)
A(k^)h
=

1+
(1  ) (1  )  "Bun
(1 + n)D
 
Xcon
1+n
 hA(k^)i1  ; (24)
where the rst equality comes from the human capital formation function given by h0 =
D(h)1 (x) and the second equality comes from the policy function of x presented in
Proposition 5. Equation (24) indicates that there is unique, stable steady-state capital.
In the next section, we focus on steady states and compare cases in the presence and
absence of the debt rule in (22) in terms of the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio,
capital and labor taxes, and growth rates. We also compare the cases in terms of utility
across generations.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
Our task here is to compare cases in the absence and presence of the debt rule in (22)
based on numerical methods. Our strategy is to calibrate the model economy such that
the steady-state equilibrium with b > 0 matches some key statistics of average OECD
countries during 1995{2014.5 We x the share of capital at  = 1=3 following Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and Lancia and Russo (2016). Each period lasts 30
years; this assumption is standard in quantitative analyses of the two- or three-period
overlapping-generations model (e.g., Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008; Lancia and Russo,
2016). Our selection of  is 0.99 per quarter, which is also standard in the literature (e.g.,
Kydland and Prescott, 1982; de la Croix and Doepke, 2002). Since agents in the present
model plan over generations that span 30 years, we discount the future by (0:99)120.
We assume an annual population growth rate of 1:0059; which was the OECD average
during 1995{2014. This assumption implies that the net population growth rate for 30
years is (1:0059)30  1. Following Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2016) and Lancia and
Russo (2016), we set ! to 0:48.
For , we focus on the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the steady state:
Nt+1xt
Yt
= Xun =
 (1  )
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
:
Given  = 1=3,  = (0:99)120, 1 + n = (1:0059)30, and ! = 0:48; we can solve this
5Source: World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi (Accessed on
March 3, 2018).
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expression for  by using the average ratio observed in OECD countries of 0:051 and
obtain  = 0:504:
To determine the two productivity parameters, A andD, we normalize the steady-state
wage, w, to unity. Thus, we have w = (1  )A(k) = 1, or
(1  )
"

1+
(1  ) (1  ) Bun
(1 + n)
 
Xun
1+n

#=(1 (1 ))
(D) =(1 (1 )) (A)1=(1 (1 )) = 1: (25)
We also use the data on the per capita GDP gross growth rate of 1:02, which was the
OECD average during 1995{2014. We substitute these data and the values of ; ; n; ;
and ! into the following equation expressing the per capita GDP gross growth rate:
h0
h
=

Xun
1 + n
 " 
1+
(1  ) (1  ) Bun
(1 + n)
 
Xun
1+n

#=(1 (1 ))
(D)(1 )=(1 (1 )) (A)=(1 (1 ))
= (1:02)30: (26)
We solve the two equations, (25) and (26), for A and D; and obtain A = 4:58 and
D = 7:24.
The economy is assumed to be in a steady state in period 0. The initial capital k^0
is computed by solving equation (24) for k^. The initial value of human capital, h0, is
normalized at h0 = 1. From the result in Section 3, in the absence of any scal rule,
the ratio b=k^h in the steady state is given by b=k^h = (1  ) =. Thus, we set b0 at
b0 = [(1  ) =] k^0h0 and compare the cases with and without a debt rule for the same
initial conditions.
4.3.1 Comparative Statics
We study how the steady-state equilibrium responds to changes in the debt rule in (22). In
particular, we focus on ". When " = 1; the equilibrium policy functions and corresponding
economic growth rate coincide with those in the absence of the debt rule as in Section
3. When " = 0, they coincide with those in the tax-nancing case as in Section 4.1.
In the following, we consider a decrease in " that aims to tighten scal discipline and
investigate its impact on scal policy, economic growth, and welfare across generations.
Figure 1 plots the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio, labor and capital tax rates, ratio
of physical to human capital, and per capita growth rate in the steady state, taking " on
the horizontal axis from 0 to 1.6
[Figure 1 here.]
6In Figure 1, each panel illustrates two cases, ! = 0:48 and 0:6. The analysis here is restricted to the
case of ! = 0:48. The case of ! = 0:6 is discussed in Section 5.
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Fiscal tightening (i.e., a decrease in ") has the following eects on the education
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Firstly, the government raises the labor tax rate to compensate
for the loss of revenue from public bond issues, as depicted in Panel (a). This lowers the
disposable income of the middle-aged population, which in turn raises the marginal cost of
public education expenditure in terms of utility. This is a negative eect of scal discipline
on public education expenditure. Secondly, a decrease in the disposable income leads to
less saving and thus a lower ratio of physical to human capital. At the same time, scal
tightening reduces the crowding-out eect of public debt. The net eect on the ratio of
physical to human capital is positive as shown in Panel (b), implying a negative eect on
the interest rate. This general equilibrium eect through the interest rate in turn leads
the government to increase public education expenditure, which reduces savings and thus
works to raise the interest rate. In sum, the two opposing eects on the choice of public
education expenditure produces an initial increase in the education expenditure-to-GDP
ratio followed by a decrease, as depicted in Panel (c).
Next, consider the eect of scal tightening on the choice of the capital tax rate.
Firstly, this raises the marginal benet of capital taxation. This positive eect parallels
the eect on the choice of public education expenditure as described above. However,
an additional eect on the marginal benet arises through the term b^=kh in the policy
function of  k. Fiscal tightening lowers the ratio b^=kh and thus produces a negative eect
on the marginal benet. This negative eect outweighs the positive eect. Therefore, the
government chooses a lower capital tax rate to balance the marginal cost and benet as "
decreases, as depicted in Panel (d). In other words, scal tightening shifts the tax burden
from the old to the middle-aged. Finally, scal tightening raises the per capita growth rate
as shown in Panel (e) because the positive eects through the increased ratio of physical
to human capital and decreased capital tax rate outweigh the negative eect through the
increased labor tax and non-monotone eect through public education expenditure.
4.3.2 Comparative Dynamics
The comparative static analysis shows that the physical-to-human capital ratio and steady-
state growth rate increase as " decreases. This nding suggests that future generations
benet from increased physical and human capital. However, are all generations made
better o by scal tightening? To answer this question, Figure 2 plots the evolution of
the key indicators from the initial old population for three scenarios, " = 0:2; 0:5; and
0:8. In Panels (a){(e), we take the ratio of a variable in the presence of the debt ceiling to
that in its absence for each period. The lines in each panel imply the ratio of the relevant
variable in the presence of the debt ceiling to that in its absence. Each ratio implies that
the presence of the debt ceiling outweighs its absence when the ratio is above unity.
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In Panel (f), we plot the dierence in utility between the presence and absence of
the debt ceiling from generation -1 to generation 4. Generation t attains higher (lower)
utility in the presence of the debt ceiling than in its absence when the dierence is positive
(negative). The gure indicates that the initial old population as well as generation 1
onward are made better o by the introduction of the debt rule in (22), whereas generation
0 is made worse o. Thus, scal tightening is not Pareto-improving.
[Figure 2 here.]
The mechanism behind the result is straightforward. Under the present assumption,
the government's optimal choice of the debt-to-GDP ratio is Bun; however, its choice is
limited up to "Bun(< Bun) by the rule in (22). Because of this constraint, the government
in period 0 is unable to attain an \interior optimum." In particular, the constraint hits the
middle-aged population in generation 0. Governments from period 1 are also constrained
by the rule, but they benet from the higher levels of physical and human capital be-
queathed from past generations. This benet outweighs the cost of the constraint in (22).
Therefore, the introduction of the debt rule creates a trade-o between generations in
terms of utility.
The eects of decreased " on utility is monotone from generation 0 onward, as shown in
Figure 2. However, the eect is non-monotone for the initial old population. In particular,
a decrease in " from 1:0 to 0:5 improves their utility, but a further decrease worsens it.
This non-monotone eect stems from the initial decrease followed by an increase in the
period 0 capital tax rate, as depicted in Figure 3. The U-shaped pattern of the period
0 capital tax rate parallels the hump-shaped pattern of public education expenditure
described above.
[Figure 3 here.]
Finally, we consider the case where the debt rule is imposed only for limited periods.
In particular, the debt rule in (22) is introduced in period 2, but terminated at the end of
period 2, 3, or 4, meaning that successive governments from the termination period onward
are free to choose policies with no rule. Figure 4 illustrates the eect of this temporary
implementation of the scal rule on scal policies, the ratio of physical to human capital,
per capita human capital, per capita GDP, and consumption and utility across generations
when " = 0:5. As expected, the rule produces a temporary eect on scal policies,
the physical-to-human capital ratio, and per capita GDP. However, it has a long-lasting
eect on utility across generations owing to the increased human capital bequeathed from
generation to generation. This long-lasting eect of the temporary rule, which was not
shown by Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016), is caused by human capital accumulation
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stimulated by debt-nanced public education expenditure. Therefore, this result suggests
the importance of connecting seemingly unrelated subjects, public education and public
debt, to consider the impact of a debt rule over time and across generations.
[Figure 4 here.]
5 Planner's Allocation
In the previous section, we use the Pareto criterion to evaluate the welfare consequence
of the debt rule. Here, we take an alternative approach by deriving an optimal allocation
that maximizes an innite discounted sum of generational utilities for an arbitrary social
discount factor. In particular, we consider a benevolent planner who can commit to all
his or her choices at the beginning of a period, subject to the human capital formation
function and the resource constraint. Assuming such a planner, we evaluate the political
equilibrium in the presence and absence of the debt ceiling by comparing it with the
planner's allocation in terms of consumption, per capita GDP, and welfare over time and
across generations.
The planner is assumed to value the welfare of all generations. In particular, the
objective of the planner is to maximize a discounted sum of the lifecycle utility of all
current and future generations:
SW =
1X
t= 1
tUt; 0 <  < 1;
under the human capital formation function in (1) and the resource constraint:
Ntct +Nt 1dt +Kt+1 +Nt+1xt = A (Kt)
 (Ht)
1  ;
or
ct +
dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n)k^t+1ht+1 + (1 + n)xt = A

k^t

ht;
where k^0 and h0 are given. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the planner's discount factor. Re-
verse discounting, 1=(> 1), must be applied to U 1 (i.e., the utility of the old generation
in the initial period) to preserve dynamic consistency.
Solving the problem leads to the following characterization of the planner's allocation.
Proposition 6. Given k^0 and h0, a sequence of the planner's allocation,
n
ct; dt; xt; k^t+1; ht+1
o1
t=0
,
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satises the human capital formation function in (1) and the following:
ct =
 (1  ) [1   (1  )]
( + ) [1   (1  )] A

k^t

ht;
dt
1 + n
=
 (1  ) [1   (1  )]
( + ) [1   (1  )] A

k^t

ht;
(1 + n)k^t+1 =

D
h
(1 )
(1+n)[1 (1 )]
i hAk^ti1  ;
(1 + n)xt =
(1  ) 
1   (1  )A

k^t

ht:
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
In the following, we compare the planner's allocation with the political equilibrium
based on numerical methods. The parameter values for the analysis are the same as those
in Section 4.3 if not otherwise specied.
5.1 Comparison of the Planner's Allocation with the Political
Equilibrium in the Absence of a Debt Ceiling
We rst compare the planner's allocation with the political equilibrium in the absence of
a debt ceiling. In Figure 5, we assume  = (0:99)120 in the planner's allocation and plot
the evolution of physical capital (Panel (a)), human capital (Panel (b)), per capita GDP
(Panel (c)), consumption in middle age (Panel (d)), and consumption in old age (Panel
(e)) from periods t = 0 to 5. We take the ratio of a variable at the political equilibrium to
that in the planner's allocation for each period. The lines in each gure imply the ratio of
the relevant variable at the political equilibrium to that in the planner's allocation. Each
ratio implies that the political equilibrium outweighs the planner's allocation when the
ratio is above unity. In Panel (f), we plot the dierence in utility between the political
equilibrium and the planner's allocation from generation  1 to generation 4. Generation
t attains higher (lower) utility at the political equilibrium than in the planner's allocation
when the dierence is positive (negative).
[Figure 5 here.]
The planner's allocation attains higher physical and human capital and higher per
capita GDP than at the political equilibrium, as depicted in Panels (a), (b), and (c) of
Figure 5. The share of the resources devoted to education is higher in the planner's al-
location than at the political equilibrium because the long-lived planner has an incentive
to invest more in education than short-lived politicians. Investment in education stimu-
lates human capital formation and increases the output and resources devoted to physical
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capital formation in the planner's allocation. Therefore, the planner's allocation attains
higher physical and human capital and per capita GDP than at the political equilibrium
from period 1 onward.
The argument above implies that the share of the resources devoted to consumption
is lower in the planner's allocation than at the political equilibrium. Because of this
property, the middle- and old-age consumption levels in period 0 are lower in the planner's
allocation than at the political equilibrium (see Panels (d) and (e)). However, the available
resources in the planner's allocation are larger than at the political equilibrium from period
1 onward. Because of this positive income eect, the planner's allocation attains higher
levels of consumption for the middle-aged and old from period 1 onward than at the
political equilibrium (see Panels (d) and (e)). These results imply that generations -1
and 0 are made better o at the political equilibrium than in the planner's allocation,
whereas agents from generation 1 onward are made worse o. In other words, short-sighted
politicians produce a trade-o between generations in terms of welfare.
5.2 Comparison of the Planner's Allocation with the Political
Equilibrium in the Presence of a Debt Ceiling
We next compare the planner's allocation with the political equilibrium in the presence
of a debt ceiling and examine the way of approximating the planner's allocation through
the control of the parameter " representing the debt ceiling. As demonstrated above,
generations from t = 1 onward are worse o at the political equilibrium in the absence of
a debt ceiling than in the planner's allocation. In addition, a change in the debt ceiling,
", creates an intergenerational trade-o in terms of utility, as shown in Section 4. These
results imply that all generations from t = 1 onward may benet from strengthening
scal discipline (i.e., lowering ") at the expense of generation t = 0. However, the sum
of the benets of all future generations may outweigh the cost incurred by generation
t = 0, suggesting a rationale for focusing on generations from t = 1 onward. Therefore,
we hereafter consider the eect of the debt ceiling on generations from t = 1 onward.
Three cases are considered for the planner's discount factor: high, moderate, and low
(i.e.,  = (0:99)120; (0:985)120; and (0:98)120). Each case is compared with the two cases of
the political equilibrium: the case of the low political weight of the old, ! = 0:48, called a
young society, and the case of the high political weight of the old, ! = 0:6, called an aging
society. The debt ceiling in the political equilibrium has three scenarios: tight discipline,
" = 0:2, moderate discipline, " = 0:5, and lax discipline, " = 0:8. We consider these three
cases of the debt ceiling as well as the absence of a debt ceiling, " = 1, and compare them
with the planner's allocation. In particular, we explore the conditions for the adjustment
of the debt ceiling to approach the planner's allocation.
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Figures 6, 7, and 8 depict the numerical results for the  = (0:99)120; (0:985)120;
and (0:98)120 cases, respectively. Each gure contains two subgures: the upper (lower)
subgure compares the planner's allocation with the political equilibrium with ! = 0:48
(0:6). Following Figure 5, we plot the evolution of the physical-to-human capital ratio
(Panel (a)), human capital (Panel (b)), per capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consump-
tion (Panel (d)), old-age consumption (Panel (e)), and the distribution of utility across
generations (Panel (f)).
First, suppose that the planner's discount factor is high such that  = (0:99)120 holds
(see Figure 6). The planner attaches a large weight to future generations, which incen-
tivizes him or her to invest considerably in human capital formation. This strong incentive
implies that generations from t = 1 onward experience higher levels of human capital, per
capita GDP, and middle- and old-age consumption in the planner's allocation than at the
political equilibrium regardless of the political weight of the old, !, and the debt ceiling,
". In other words, the planner's allocation outweighs the political equilibrium in terms of
human capital, per capita GDP, and consumption. However, physical and human capital
and per capita GDP increase at the political equilibrium as the debt ceiling, ", lowers (see
Section 4.3). Thus, the political equilibrium can close the gap to the planner's allocation
in both young and aging societies by strengthening scal discipline.
[Figure 6 is here.]
Second, suppose that the planner's discount factor is moderate such that  = (0:985)120
holds (see Figure 7). The planner in this case has less incentive to invest in physical and
human capital than in the rst case. In other words, in the present case, the political
equilibrium may outweigh the planner's allocation in terms of physical and human capital.
In particular, this outweighing eect at the political equilibrium increases as the political
weight of the old decreases, as illustrated in Panel (d) of Figure 1. This property implies
that in the young society with ! = 0:48, the political equilibrium outweighs the planner's
allocation in terms of the utility of generations from t = 1 onward. In addition, the gap
between the political equilibrium and the planner's allocation widens as the debt ceiling,
", falls. This result suggests that strengthening scal discipline is not benecial from the
planner's viewpoint.
[Figure 7 is here.]
In the aging society with ! = 0:6, the large political weight of the old has a negative
eect on physical and human capital formation. This negative eect cancels out the
abovementioned outweighing eect when " is above 0:5. Thus, generations from t = 1
onward attain lower utility at the political equilibrium than in the planner's allocation
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when initial scal discipline is weak such that " > 0:5 holds. Strengthening scal discipline
improves utility and closes the gap to the planner's allocation. However, when initial
scal discipline is strict such that " < 0:5 holds, the implication is reversed. Generations
from t = 1 onward attain higher utility at the political equilibrium than in the planner's
allocation and the gap to the planner's allocation widens as the debt ceiling, ", lowers. The
results described thus far suggest that when the planner's discount factor is  = (0:985)120,
the welfare implications of the debt ceiling depends critically on the political weight of
the old, !, as well as the initial condition of the debt ceiling, ".
Third, suppose that the planner's discount factor is low such that  = (0:98)120 holds
(see Figure 8). Compared with the second case, the present case gives the planner less
incentive to invest in physical and human capital. Because of this property, the planner's
allocation is outweighed by the political equilibrium in terms of physical and human
capital, per capita GDP, and middle- and old-age consumption, regardless of the political
weight of the old, !, or the debt ceiling, ". This implies that lowering the debt ceiling, ",
in the political equilibrium improves utility but widens the gap to the planner's allocation.
Thus, strengthening scal discipline is not benecial from the planner's viewpoint.
[Figure 8 is here.]
The results described thus far indicate that the political equilibrium may approximate
the planner's allocation by controlling the debt ceiling, ", but that its realization depends
on the political weight of the old, !, as well as the initial condition of the debt ceiling,
". When the planner's discount factor  is high (low) such that  = (0:99)120 ((0:98)120),
lowering (raising) the debt ceiling enables us to close the gap to the planner's allocation.
However, in the moderate case where the planner's discount factor is  = (0:985)120,
lowering the debt ceiling is benecial from the planner's viewpoint in an aging society
with ! = 0:6 and " > 0:5, whereas it is detrimental in a young society with ! = 0:48.
Therefore, the political power of the old, !, as well as the initial condition of the debt
ceiling, ", matter when we evaluate the eect of strengthening scal discipline from the
planner's viewpoint.
6 Public Good Provision
Thus far, we have assumed that the old do not benet from any public expenditure.
However, when the old directly benet from public expenditure such as public good
provision, they may induce politicians to raise public expenditure on them as well as
place the scal burden on future generations by issuing more public debt. This section
examines this possibility.
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For the analysis, consider the following utility function:
Ut = ln ct +  ln gt +  [ln dt+1 +  ln gt+1] ; (27)
where g is per capita public good provision and (> 0) is the weight of the utility of public
good provision. Aggregate public good expenditure in period t is (Nt +Nt 1) gt, meaning
that the government budget constraint becomes
(1 + n)bt+1 + 
k
t Rt
st 1
1 + n
+ twtht = (1 + n)xt +
2 + n
1 + n
gt +Rtbt: (28)
We assume the no public debt rule.
In this setting, the political objective function in (10) is reformulated as follows:

g ' !
(1 + n)(1  !)

ln
 
1   k+  ln g+ (1 + ) ln Z  k; x; b0; k^; b; h  2 + n
1 + n
g

+  lnR

K^

b0; x; Z

 k; x; b0; k^; b; h

+  ln
 
1   k0+  ln g +  ln g0;
where 
g denotes the political objective function in the presence of public good provision.
The function 
g diers from the function in the baseline model, 
, in that (i) after-tax
income Z() is replaced by Z()   (2 + n)g=(1 + n) and (ii) the utility of public good
provision enters additively into the function. Keeping this dierence in mind, we solve
the problem of the government and obtain the following policy functions.
Proposition 7. In the presence of public good provision, a Markov-perfect political
equilibrium is characterized by the following policy functions:
 k = 1  1
1 + 
T kun
1


1 + b
k^h
 ;
(1 + n)x = XunA

k^

h;
 =
(
1  1
1+
Tun if 1 >  (1 + ) ;
1  1
1+
 1+(1+)
1+
Tun if 1   (1 + ) ;
(1 + n)b0 =
(
1
1+
 1 (1+)
1  BunA

k^

h if 1 >  (1 + ) ;
0 if 1   (1 + ) ;
2 + n
1 + n
g =

h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i
(1 + )
h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
iAk^ h:
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Comparing the results in the absence and presence of public good provision (i.e.,
Propositions 1 and 8, respectively), we nd that the debt-to-GDP ratio in the presence
of public good provision is lower than that in its absence. The old may thus have an
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incentive to pass the burden of public good provision by issuing public debt. However,
the middle-aged, who also benet from public good provision, nd it optimal to reduce
debt issues and increase public good provision in their old age from the viewpoint of their
utility. Because of this disciplined eect, as also found by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti
(2012), the government representing both the middle-aged and the old nds it optimal to
reduce rather than increase public debt issues.
To understand the disciplined eect more precisely, consider the rst-order condition
with respect to b0, which is given as follows:
@

@b0
+

g0
 @g
0
@K^

0BBBB@ @K^@ Z()  2+n1+ng 
@

Z()  2+n
1+n
g

@b0| {z }
(d.1)
+
@K^
@b0|{z}
(d.2)
1CCCCA  0;
where the rst term on the left-hand side, denoted by @
=@b0, includes all the terms
observed in the absence of public good provision and the second term shows the disciplined
eect that is specic to the present case. The disciplined eect is composed of two parts:
(i) increased after-tax income, which in turn increases saving and physical capital and
thus raises the provision of public goods in the next period, as presented by the term
(d.1), and (ii) the crowding out of physical capital, which in turn decreases public good
provision in the next period, as presented by the term (d.2). Thus, there are two opposing
eects of public debt issues on the provision of public goods and the net eect is negative
in the present framework. Because of this negative eect, the government reduces public
debt issues as the weight of the public good, denoted by , increases. In particular, when
 is high such that  (1 + )  1 holds, there is no public debt issue; spending is solely
nanced by taxation.
7 Conclusion
This study developed an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital
accumulation and analyzed voting on scal policy. In particular, it considered the eect
of debt ceilings on scal policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare over time
and across generations. The eciency of the debt ceiling was measured based on the
Pareto criterion. It was shown that the introduction of the debt ceiling is not Pareto-
improving; it increases economic growth, but creates a trade-o between generations in
terms of welfare.
The study further evaluated the debt ceiling from an alternative viewpoint, that is,
an imaginary benevolent planner who can allocate resources across generations. It was
found that the planner's allocation can be approached by controlling the debt ceiling. In
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particular, under certain conditions, lowering the debt ceiling enables us to approach the
planner's allocation when the political power of the old is strong, suggesting a rationale
for strengthening scal discipline in an aging society.
While the present study shed light on the evaluation of the debt ceiling from the
political economy viewpoint, the analysis could be extended in several directions. For
instance, the main analysis assumed away public good provision that benets the retired
old. In Section 6, the case including public good provision was briey analyzed, whereas
the evaluation of the debt ceilings in that case was left untouched. In addition, the
analysis focused on the debt ceiling and alternative scal rules such as balanced budget
rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules were left untouched, which are common in
many countries. The exploration of these extensions is left to future work.
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A Proofs and Supplementary Explanations
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The conjecture in (13) is reformulated by using (11) and (12) as follows:
 k0 = 1  T kun
k^0h0


k^0h0 + b0

= 1  T kun
A

k^

h   1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b  (1 + n)x+ (1 + n)b0   1+

(1 + n)b0


A

k^

h  (1   k)A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

  (1 + n)x+ (1 + n)b0

= 1  T kun
Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0
Z() : (29)
By using (29) and rearranging the terms, the rst-order conditions in (15){(16) are refor-
mulated as
 k :   !
(1 + n)(1  !)
1
1   k +
A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

Z() +
A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0
 0;
(30)
b0 :
1 + n
Z()  
(1 + n)
Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0
 0; (31)
x :
 (1  )
x
  1 + n
Z()  
(1 + n)
Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0
= 0: (32)
Suppose that b0 = 0 holds. Eq. (31) implies that b0 = 0 if (1 + n) (1+ n)  0; that
is, if (1  ) =  0, which never holds 8 2 (0; 1). Thus, we obtain b0 > 0.
Given that b0 > 0 holds, the rst-order condition with respect to b0 in (31) holds with
an equality. From (31) and (32), we obtain
(1 + ) (1 + n)
Z
=
 (1  )
x
: (33)
From (30) and (32), we have
A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b
  
1   k = !(1+n)(1 !)
 (1  )(1 + n)x: (34)
We substitute (34) into the rst-order condition with respect to b0 in (31). After
rearranging the terms, we obtain the following relation between x and b0 :
(1  )
"
A

k^

h 
 
!
(1+n)(1 !)
 (1  ) + 1
!
(1 + n)x
#
=

 +
1


(1 + n)b0: (35)
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We can obtain another relation between x and b0 by substituting (34) into (33):
(1 + n)b0 =
"
1 + 
 (1  ) + 1 +
!
(1+n)(1 !)
 (1  )
#
(1 + n)x  A

k^

h: (36)
By solving (35) and (36) for x and b0, we obtain the policy functions of x and b0 as in
Proposition 1.
We substitute the obtained policy function, X, into (34) to derive
1   k =
!
(1+n)(1 !)
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]
 1


1 + b
k^h
 :
Finally, we can compute the labor tax rate by substituting the obtained  k, x, and b0 into
the government budget constraint in (12).

A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Recall the policy function of  k in Proposition 1. The second part of the corollary is
immediately obtained by setting  k0 > 0. For the proof of the rst part, consider the ratio
bt=k^tht, in period t  1. We use the capital market-clearing condition in (11) and the
policy functions in Proposition 1 to reformulate the ratio bt=k^tht for t  1 as follows:
bt
k^tht
=
1
1+n
BunA

k^t 1

ht 1
1
1+n

1+
(1  t 1) (1  )A

k^t 1

ht 1   bt
=
1
1+n
BunA

k^t 1

ht 1
1
1+n

1+
1+
1 
1
!
(1+n)(1 !)+1+[+(1 )]
(1  )A

k^t 1

ht 1   11+nBunA

k^t 1

ht 1
=
1  

:
By using this result, we can reformulate  kt , t  1; as
 kt = 1  T kun
1

 
1 + 1 


= 1  1
1 + (1+n)(1 !)
!
f1 +  [ +  (1  )]g :
The expression shows that  kt is decreasing in ! with lim!!1 
k
t = 0 for t  1.

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A.3 Derivation of (17) and (18) and Proof of Proposition 2
Recall the human capital formation function, h0 = D(x)(h)1 . With the use of the
policy function of x in Proposition 1, this function is rewritten as
h0
h
= D
"
1
1 + n
 (1  )
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
# h
A

k^
i
; (37)
or,
h0
h
= D	H
h
A

k^
i
;
where 	H is dened as in (20).
Next, consider the capital market-clearing condition in (11). With the use of the policy
function of  in Proposition 1, (11) is rewritten as
(1 + n)k^0h0 =

!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
A

k^

h: (38)
By substituting (37) into (38) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
k^0 =

!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]

(1 + n)D

Xun
1 + n
 1 h
A

k^
i1 
; (39)
which is reduced as in (17).
In the steady state, b=k^h = b0=k^0h0 holds, so
b
k^h
=
(1 )
!
(1+n)(1 !)+1+[+(1 )]
A

k^

h

!
(1+n)(1 !)+1+[+(1 )]
A

k^

h
=
1  

; (40)
where the rst equality comes from the policy function of b0 in Proposition 1 and the
capital market-clearing condition in (38).
From (40), the tax rate on capital,  k, becomes
 k = 1 
!
(1+n)(1 !)
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
 1

 
1 + 1 

 ;
or
 k = 1 
!
(1+n)(1 !)
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
2 (0; 1):
The tax rate on labor,  , is given by
 = 1  1 + 
1  
1
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]
< 1:
We obtain
  0, 1 + 
1     f1 +  [ +  (1  )]g 
!
(1 + n)(1  !) ; (41)
as expressed in Proposition 2.

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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
When b0 = 0, the rst-order conditions with respect to  k in (52) and x in (53) are
rewritten as
 k :
!
(1 + n)(1  !)
1
1   k =
A

k^
 1
(1 + )

k^h+ b

Z() ; (42)
x :
 (1  )
(1 + n)x
=
(1 + n)(1 + )
Z() ; (43)
respectively. From (42) and (43), we obtain
(1 + n)x =
(1 + n)(1  !)
!
 (1  )A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b
  
1   k : (44)
We substitute (44) into (42) and rearrange the terms to obtain
 k = 1  TKun
1


1 + b
k^h
 : (45)
This is identical to the corresponding policy function in the debt-nancing case. By
plugging (45) into (42), we obtain the policy function of X as
(1 + n)x = XunA

k^

h:
This is also identical to the corresponding policy function in the debt-nancing case.
We can obtain the labor income tax rate by substituting the policy functions of  k, x;
and b0 = 0 into the government budget constraint in (12) as follows:
 = 1  1
1  
1 + 
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [+  (1  )]
:
This diers from the corresponding policy function in the debt-nancing case.
Finally, the accumulation of physical and human capital is computed by substituting
the policy functions into the capital market-clearing condition in (1) and the human
capital formation function in (11):
k^0 = 	K;b0=0
h
A

k^
i1 
;
h0
h
= D	H
h
A

k^
i
;
where 	H is dened in (20) and 	K;b0=0 is
	K;b0=0  
1 + 
1 + 
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]

(1 + n)D

Xun
1 + n
 1
:
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To compare the two cases, consider rst the capital tax rates. Given k^0 and b0, we
immediately nd that  k0

tax
=  k0

debt
holds. For t  1,  kt

tax
<  kt

debt
holds because
b=k^h = 0(> 0) holds in the tax-nancing (debt-nancing) case.
Next, compare the labor tax rates and growth rates. Direct comparison leads to
 jtax >  jdebt , 0 <
1  

;
and
h0=hjtax > h0=hjdebt , 0 <
1  

:
Finally, we immediately obtain (1 + n)x=yjtax = (1 + n)x=yjdebt from Proposition 1.

A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Recall the indirect utility function of the old given by (8). Because  k0

tax
=  k0

debt
holds, as demonstrated in Proposition 5, we immediately obtain V o0 jtax = V o0 jdebt.
To consider the eect on the utility of generation 0, V M0 , recall the political objective
function in period 0:

0 =
!
(1 + n)(1  !)V
o
0 + V
M
0 :
The objective function, 
0 is maximized by choosing b
0 > 0, as shown in Proposition 1.
However, the government choice is constrained when it is forced to nance its expenditure
solely by taxes. That is, the government attains a lower value of its objective under tax
nancing than under debt nancing: 
0jtax < 
0jdebt. This implies V M0

tax
< V M0

debt
since V o0 jtax = V o0 jdebt holds.
(ii) Recall the indirect utility function of the middle-aged in (7). Suppose that from
some period t0( 1) onward, the economy is in a steady state regardless of the govern-
ment's nancing method. The indirect utility function in (7) becomes
V Mt

j
= (1 + ) ln(1  )A

k^

j
 
htjj

1   jj

+  [(  1) + ] ln k^

j
+  ln

1   kt+1

j

+ M ;
' (1 + ) ln k^

j
+ (1 + ) ln

1   jj

+  ln

1   kt+1

j

+ (1 + ) ln htjj ; j = tax; debt (46)
where the constant terms are omitted from the expression.
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With the use of the policy functions presented in Proposition 1 and Appendix A.4,
(46) is rewritten as follows:
V Mt

j
' (1 + ) ln k^

j
+ (1 + ) ln

1   jj

+  ln
1
1 +

bt+1=k^t+1ht+1

j
+ (1 + ) ln htjj ;
or
V Mt

j
' (1 + ) ln k^

j
+ (1 + ) ln

1   jj

+ (1 + ) ln

h0=hjj
t t0
ht0 jj ; j = tax; debt:
The direct comparison of V M1

tax
and V M1

debt
leads to
V M1

tax
? V M1

debt
, (t  t0) (1 + ) ln h
0=hjtax
h0=hjdebt
? (1 + ) ln
k^

debt
k^

tax
+ (1 + ) ln
1   jdebt
1   jtax
+ (1 + ) ln
ht0 jdebt
ht0 jtax
; (47)
where the left-hand and right-hand sides of (47) are denoted by LHS and RHS; respec-
tively. These satisfy the following properties:
@LHS=@t > 0; LHSjt=t0 = 0; limt!1LHS =1; and @RHS=@t = 0:
Therefore, there is a positive integer, denoted by t^, such that LHS ? RHS , V Mt

tax
?
V Mt

debt
for t ? t^.

A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
With the use of (1 + n)b0 = "BunA

k^

h; the government budget constraint in (12) is
reformulated as
"BunA

k^

h+  (1  )A

k^

h+  kA

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

= (1 + n)x+ A

k^
 1
b;
and the capital market-clearing condition in (11) is rewritten as
"BunA

k^

h+ (1 + n)k^0h0 =

1 + 
(1  ) (1  )A

k^

h:
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We conjecture the following capital tax rate in the next period:
 k0 = 1  T kcon
1


1 + b
0
k^0h0
 ;
where the subscript \con" of T kcon implies that public debt issuance is \constrained" by
the rule in (22). By using the capital market-clearing condition and government budget
constraint, we can rewrite the conjecture as follows:
 k0 = 1  T kcon
(1  ) (1  )  1+

"Bun
 (1  ) (1  ) : (48)
We substitute (48) into the political objective function in (23) and rearrange the terms
to obtain

 ' !
(1 + n)(1  !) ln
 
1   k+ ln ~Z1 +  ln ~Z2 +  (1  ) ln x; (49)
where
~Z1  A

k^

h   1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b  (1 + n)x+ "BunAk^ h; (50)
~Z2  A

k^

h   1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b  (1 + n)x  1

"Bun: (51)
The rst-order conditions with respect to  k and ~x are
 k :   !
(1 + n)(1  !)
1
1   k + A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b
 1
~Z1
+

~Z2

= 0; (52)
x :
 (1  )
(1 + n)x
 

1
~Z1
+

~Z2

= 0: (53)
These conditions are summarized as
1   k = !
(1 + n)(1  !) 
(1 + n)x
 (1  ) 
1


1 + b=k^h
 : (54)
With the use of (54), ~Z1 and ~Z2 in (50) and (51) are rewritten as follows:8<: ~Z
1 = (1 + "Bun)A

k^

h 
h
1 + !
(1+n)(1 !)  1(1 )
i
(1 + n)x;
~Z2 = (1 + "Bun)A

k^

h 
h
1 + !
(1+n)(1 !)
1
(1 )
i
(1 + n)x  1+

"BunA

k^

h:
(55)
The substitution of (55) into the rst-order condition with respect to x in (53) leads to
 (1  )
(1 + n)x
=
1
~Z1
+

~Z1   1+

"Bun
: (56)
Figure A.1 illustrates the graph of (56), taking (1 + n)~x on the horizontal axis. The
gure indicates that there are two candidates for a solution to (56). However, the larger
one is not feasible since ~Z1 < 0 holds. Therefore, the smaller one is the solution to (56).
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[Figure A.1 here.]
To derive the solution to (56), we reformulate (56) as follows:
 (1  )
(1 + n)x
=
~Z1   1+

"Bun +  ~Z
1
~Z1

~Z1   1+

"Bun
 ;
or
f ((1 + n)~x)  G ((1 + n)x)2  H(1 + n)x+ I = 0; (57)
where G; H; and I are dened in Proposition 5. Note that H > 0 and I > 0 hold because
"Bun <  holds.
By solving (57) for (1 + n)x and taking the smaller solution, we obtain
(1 + n)x = Xcon 
H  
q
(H)2   4GI
2G
: (58)
The substitution of (58) into (54) yields
1   k = !
(1 + n)(1  !) 
H 
p
(H)2 4GI
2G
 (1  ) 
1


1 + b=k^h
 ; (59)
which veries the initial guess. Finally, the labor tax rate is derived by substituting (58)
and (59) into the government budget constraint.

A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
In the present framework, the state variable ht does not line in a compact set because it
continues to grow along an optimal path. To reformulate the planner's problem into one
in which the state variable lies in a compact set, we undertake the following normalization:
~ct  ct=ht; ~dt  dt=ht; ~xt  xt=ht:
Then, the resource constraint, ct + dt=(1 + n) + (1 + n)k^t+1ht+1 + (1 + n)xt = A

k^t

ht,
is rewritten as
~ct +
~dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n)k^t+1
ht+1
ht
+ (1 + n)~xt = A

k^t

:
With the use of ht+1 = D (ht)
1  (xt)
 ; this is further reformulated as
~ct +
~dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n)k^t+1D (~xt)
 + (1 + n)~xt = A

k^t

: (60)
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The utility functions are rewritten as follows:
U 1 =  ln ~d0 +  lnh0;
U0 = ln ~c0 + lnh0 +  ln ~d1 +  lnD (~x0)
 h0;
U1 = ln ~c1 + lnD (~x0)
 h0 +  ln ~d2 +  lnDD (~x0)
 (~x1)
 h0;
...
Ut = ln ~ct + ln (D)
t (~xt 1)
 (~xt 2)
      (~x0) h0
+  ln ~dt+1 +  ln (D)
t+1 (~xt)
 (~xt 1)
      (~x0) h0;
...
In particular, generation-t utility is rewritten as
Ut = ln ~ct +  ln ~dt+1 +  (1 + )
t 1X
j=0
ln ~xj +  ln ~xt + (1 + ) lnh0 + [t+  (t+ 1)] lnD:
Thus, omitting the politically unrelated terms, the social welfare function becomes
SW ' 

ln ~d0
+ ln ~c0 +  ln ~d1 +  ln ~x0
+  
h
ln ~c1 +  ln ~d2 + (1 + )  ln ~x0 +  ln ~x1
i
+ 2 
h
ln ~c2 +  ln ~d3 + (1 + )  ln ~x0 +  (1 + ) ln ~x1 +  ln ~x2
i
+    ;
that is,
SW '
1X
t=0
t 

ln ~ct +


ln ~dt + 

 +

1   (1 + )

ln ~xt

: (61)
Plugging (60) into (61), the planner's problem becomes
max
1X
t=0
t 
(
ln
"
A

k^t

 
~dt
1 + n
  (1 + n)k^t+1D (~xt)   (1 + n)~xt
#
+


ln ~dt + 

 +

1   (1 + )

ln ~xt

given k^0:
We can express the Bellman equation for the problem as follows:
V (k) = max
f ~d;~x;k^0g
(
ln
"
A

k^

 
~d
1 + n
  (1 + n)k^0D (~x)   (1 + n)~x
#
+


ln ~d+ 

 +

1   (1 + )

ln ~x+ V (k^0)

: (62)
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We make the guess V (k0) = z0+z1 ln k0; where z0 and z1 are undetermined coecients.
For this guess, (62) becomes
V (k) = max
f ~d;~x;k^0g
(
ln
"
A

k^

 
~d
1 + n
  (1 + n)k^0D (~x)   (1 + n)~x
#
+


ln ~d+ 

 +

1   (1 + )

ln ~x+ 
h
z0 + z1 ln k^
0
i
: (63)
The rst-order conditions with respect to ~d; ~x; and k^0 are
~d :
 1=(1 + n)
A

k^

  ~d=(1 + n)  (1 + n)k^0D (~x)   (1 + n)~x
+


 1
~d
= 0; (64)
~x :
 (1 + n)
h
k^0D (~x) 1 + 1
i
A

k^

  ~d=(1 + n)  (1 + n)k^0D (~x)   (1 + n)~x
+

h
 + 
1  (1 + )
i
~x
= 0; (65)
k^0 :
 (1 + n)D (~x)
A

k^

  ~d=(1 + n)  (1 + n)k^0D (~x)   (1 + n)~x
+
z1
k^0
= 0: (66)
Eqs. (64) and (65) lead to
~d
1 + n
=



(1 + n)~x
h
k^0D (~x) 1 + 1
i
 + 
1  (1 + )
; (67)
and Eqs. (64) and (66) lead to
~d
1 + n
=


 k^
0
z1
(1 + n)D (~x) : (68)
By plugging (67) into (68) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
Dk^0 =
(~x)1 
1
z1
h
 + 
1  (1 + )
i
  1
: (69)
In addition, by plugging (69) into (67) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
~d
1 + n
=



1
z1
1
z1
h
 + 
1  (1 + )
i
  1
(1 + n)~x: (70)
We substitute (69) and (70) into the rst-order condition with respect to ~d in (64) to
obtain
(1 + n)~x =
1


1
z1

 +

1   (1 + )

  1

A

k^

; (71)
where  is dened by
   + 

 1
z1
+
1

+
1
z1

 +

1   (1 + )

  1:
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The substitution of (71) into (70) leads to the following policy function of ~d :
~d
1 + n
=
1

 

 1
z1
A

k^

: (72)
With (69) and (71), we have
(1 + n)k^0D (~x) =
1

A

k^

: (73)
We substitute (71), (72), and (73) into the resource constraint in (60) to obtain the
following policy function of ~c :
~c =
1
z1
A

k^

: (74)
We also obtain from (71) and (73) the law of motion of physical capital:
k^0 =
h
A

k^
i1 
(1 + n)D
n
1
(1+n)
h
1
z1

 + 
1  (1 + )

  1
io : (75)
Substituting (71), (72), (74), and (75) into the Bellman equation gives
V (k) = 

1 +


+ 

 +

1   (1 + )

+ z1 (1  )

ln k^ + C (z0; z1) ;
where C (z0; z1) includes constant terms. The guess is veried if z0 = C (z0; z1) and
z1 = 

1 +


+ 

 +

1   (1 + )

+ z1 (1  )

:
Therefore, z1 is given by
z1 =

n
1 + 

+ 
h
 + 
1  (1 + )
io
1   (1  ) ;
and the corresponding policy functions are obtained as expressed in Proposition 6.

A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
The dierence of the model in Section 7 from the baseline model is the presence of
public good provision, appeared as  ln gt +  ln gt+1 in the utility function of (27) and
as (2+n)g=(1+n) in the government budget constraint of (28). Thus, in the presence of
public good provision, the after-tax income of the middle-aged is Z()  (2 + n)g=(1 + n)
and the next-period ratio of physical to human capital is
k^0 = K^

b0; x; Z()  2 + n
1 + n
g



1+

Z()  2+n
1+n
g
  (1 + n)b0
(1 + n)D (x)
:
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The political objective function in (10) is reformulated as follows:

 ' !
(1 + n)(1  !)

ln
 
1   k+  ln g+ (1 + ) ln Z  k; x; b0; k^; b; h  2 + n
1 + n
g

+ lnR

K^

b0; x; Z

 k; x; b0; k^; b; h

  2 + n
1 + n
g

+  ln
 
1   k0+  ln g +  ln g0;
(76)
and the conjecture of  k0 in (29) is reformulated as follows:
 k0 = 1  T kg
Z()  2+n
1+n
g   1+

(1 + n)b0


Z()  2+n
1+n
g
 ; (77)
where T kg (> 0) is constant. We also conjecture the public good provision in the next
period as
g0 = Gg  A

k^0

h0:
This leads to
 ln g0 '  ln

Z()  1 + 

(1 + n)b0   2 + n
1 + n
g

+ (1  ) lnx: (78)
By substituting (77) and (78) into (76) and rearranging the terms, we have

 ' !
(1 + n)(1  !) ln
 
1   k+ ln Z()  2 + n
1 + n
g

+  (1 + ) ln

Z()  1 + 

(1 + n)b0   2 + n
1 + n
g

+

!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1

 ln g
+  (1 + ) (1  ) ln x: (79)
The rst-order conditions with respect to  k; b0; x; and g are as follows:
 k :   !
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1
1   k +
A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

Z()  2+n
1+n
g
+
 (1 + )A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0   2+n
1+n
g
= 0;
(80)
b0 :
1 + n
Z()  2+n
1+n
g
   (1 + ) (1 + n)
Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0   2+n
1+n
g
 0; (81)
x :
 (1 + ) (1  )
x
  1 + n
Z()  2+n
1+n
g
   (1 + ) (1 + n)
Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0   2+n
1+n
g
= 0; (82)
g :
h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

g
 
2+n
1+n
Z()  2+n
1+n
g
   (1 + )
2+n
1+n
Z()  1+

(1 + n)b0   2+n
1+n
g
= 0; (83)
where a strict inequality holds in (81) if b0 = 0.
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b0 = 0 Case Suppose that b0 = 0 holds. Eq. (81) implies that
b0 = 0 if 1   (1 + ) : (84)
When b0 = 0 holds, Eqs. (80) and (82) are rewritten as follows:
!
(1 + n)(1  !) 
1
1   k =
(1 +  (1 + ))A

k^
 1 
k^h+ b

Z()  2+n
1+n
g
; (85)
 (1 + ) (1  )
(1 + n)x
=
1 +  (1 + )
Z()  2+n
1+n
g
: (86)
Eqs. (85) and (86) lead to the optimal relation between x and  k:
(1 + n)x =
 (1 + ) (1  )
!
(1+n)(1 !)
 
1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b : (87)
Next, recall Eq. (83). When b0 = 0, this is reduced toh
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

2+n
1+n
g
=
1 +  (1 + )
Z()  2+n
1+n
g
: (88)
Eqs. (86) and (88) lead to the optimal relation between g and x :
2 + n
1 + n
g =
h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

 (1 + ) (1  )(1 + n)x: (89)
In addition, (85) and (88) lead to the optimal relation between g and  k :
2 + n
1 + n
g =
h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

!
(1+n)(1 !)
 
1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b : (90)
The substitution of (87) and (90) into (85) leads to the policy function of  k :
1   k =
!
(1+n)(1 !)
(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o  1


1 + b=k^h
 : (91)
The substitution of (91) into (87) leads to the policy function of x :
(1 + n)x =
(1  )n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o  Ak^ h; (92)
and the substitution of (92) into (89) leads to the policy function of g :
2 + n
1 + n
g =
h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o  Ak^ h: (93)
Finally, plugging (91){(93) with b0 = 0 into the government budget constraint leads to
the policy function of  :
 = 1  1
1   
1 +  (1 + )
(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o :
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A.8.1 b0 > 0 Case
Alternatively, suppose that b0 > 0 holds. The rst-order condition with respect to b0 in
(81), holding with an equality, is rewritten as follows:
(1+n)b0 =
 [1   (1 + )]
1 +  (1 + )


A

k^

h   1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b  (1 + n)x  2 + n
1 + n
g

:
(94)
Eqs. (80) and (83) lead to the optimal relation between g and  k :
 
1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b = !(1+n)(1 !)h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

 2 + n
1 + n
g; (95)
and Eqs. (82) and (83) lead to the optimal relation between x and g :
(1 + n)x =
 (1 + ) (1  )h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

 2 + n
1 + n
g: (96)
In addition, Eqs. (81) and (83) lead to
(1 + ) +

!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1



 2 + n
1 + n
g
=

!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1




A

k^

h   1   kAk^ 1 k^h+ b  (1 + n)x+ (1 + n)b0 : (97)
The substitution of (95) and (96) into (94) leads to
!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1

(1 + n)b0
=
 [1   (1 + )]
1 +  (1 + )


!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1

  A

k^

h
 

!
(1 + n)(1  !) +  (1 + ) (1  ) +

!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1



 2 + n
1 + n
g

; (98)
and the substitution of (95) and (96) into (97) leads to
!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1

(1 + n)b0 (99)
=

(1 + ) +

!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1

 +
!
(1 + n)(1  !) +  (1 + ) (1  )

 2 + n
1 + n
g  

!
(1 + n)(1  !) + 1

  A

k^

h:
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With the use of (98) and (99), we can obtain the policy functions of g and b0 as follows:
2 + n
1 + n
g =
h
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1
i

(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
oAk^ h; (100)
(1 + n)b0 =
 [1   (1 + )]
(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
oAk^ h: (101)
Eq. (101) indicates that b0 > 0 holds if and only if 1 >  (1 + ) :
The substitution of (100) into (95) leads to the policy function of  k :
1   k =
!
(1+n)(1 !)
(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o  1


1 + b=k^h
 :
The substitution of (100) into (96) leads to the policy function of x :
(1 + n)x =
(1  )n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o  Ak^ h:
Finally, we substitute the policy functions derived above into the government budget
constraint and rearrange the terms to obtain the policy function of  :
 = 1  1 + 
1   
1
(1 + )
n
!
(1+n)(1 !) + 1 +  [ +  (1  )]
o :

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Figure 1: Eects of decreased " on the education expenditure-to-GDP ratio (Panel (a)),
labor tax rate (Panel (b)), capital tax rate (Panel (c)), ratio of physical to human cap-
ital (Panel (d)), and steady-state growth rate (Panel (e)). The solid and dashed curves
correspond to the cases of ! = 0:48 and 0:6, respectively.
47
Figure 2: Evolution of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)). The solid, dashed, and dot-dashed
curves correspond to the cases of " = 0:2; 0:5; and 0:8; respectively.
48
Figure 3: Period 0 capital tax rate.
49
Figure 4: Eects of the temporary implementation of the scal rule in period 2. The
solid, dashed, and chain lines depict the cases where the rule is terminated at the end of
periods 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Note: Panels (a){(i) show the response by focusing on the ratio of a variable in the
presence of the temporary implementation to that in its absence. Panel (j) plots the
dierence in utility between the presence and absence of the temporary implementation.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)).
51
Figure 6: Evolution of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)) when  = (0:99)120.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)) when  = (0:985)120.
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Figure 8: Evolution of the ratio of physical to human capital (Panel (a)), human capital
(Panel (b)), per capita GDP (Panel (c)), middle-age consumption (Panel (d)), old-age
consumption (Panel (e)), and utility (Panel (f)) when  = (0:98)120.
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Figure A.1: Illustration of the left-hand side and right-hand side of Eq. (56).
55
